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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondant,

Vs.

Case No.
12412

REGGIE McGEE
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Reggie McGee appeals from
his conviction of Subornation of Perjury

in the First Degree.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with Subor~tion

of Perjury in the First Degree on

llie 6th day of February, 1970.

At the

heliminary Hearing, Judge Ziegler dis-

( 1)

missed the action because there was no
corroboration as to the fact of perjury
having been conunitted.

The action was

refiled on September 18, 1970,and the
appellant was bound over to the District
Court to stand trial.

The appellant was

subsequently convicted of Subornation of
Perjury in the First Degree and sentenced
to the Utah State Prison for a term of
not less than one (1), nor more than
five (5) years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant respectfully requests
this Honorable Court to reverse the judgment of the lower court and order that
the matter be dismissed.

In the alter-

native, the appellant requests that he be
granted a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 6, 1970, the appellant
(2)

was charged with "Subornation of Perjury
in the First Degree."

A Preliminary

Hearing was held before the Honorable
E. Fred Ziegler, and at the conclusion

of the State's case Judge Ziegler dismissed the matter on the grounds that
the State failed to prove one of the elements of the offense.

He ruled that to

prove Subornation of Perjury the State
must show:

(1) that perjury had been

committed, and (2) that the appellant
procured or induced Eldrege Williams to
commit that perjury.

He further ruled

that even though a single witness is sufficient to prove the element of subornation, it is necessary to have corroboration of an admitted perjurer to prove
the element of perjury.

The State did

not corroborate its single witness on the
question of perjury.
The appellant was recharged on Sept-

(3)

teIUber 18, 1970 with the same offense, and
preliminary hearing was held on October

15, 1970.

At the preliminary hearing,

the only testimony given by Eldredge
Williams concerning the question of suborna ti on was
"That McGee 'found him,'
that he doesn't recall the
conversation but that as a
result of conversation McGee
had knowledge as to what he
the witness would testify to
at the trial." (Tr.4)
On the basis of the above testimony
the defendant was bound over to stand
trial.
At trial, the only evidence the
State had as to perjury or subornation
came from the lips of Eldredge Williams,
a self-confessed perjurer.

Mr. Williams

testified that he had lied during trial
wherein Mr. McGee was charged with Grand
Larceny.

(Tr. 123).

When Williams was

asked about his conversation with McGee
and his reasons for lying we note the

(4)

following dialogue:
Q.

A.

Q.

A.

"And what, if anything,
were you asked to do in
connection with the trial?"
"Well, really I wasn't
asked to do nothing,
really, but I did it."
(Tr. 125) .
"He didn't pay you anything did he?"
"No."
(Tr. 135).

Q.

"Did he threaten you?"
"(Shakes head.)"
(Tr. 135).

Q.

"Did he say he was going
to harm you in any way if
you didn't help him?"
"No."
(Tr.135).

A.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

"Well, then was it your
own idea to do this sort
of thing?"
"In a way, yeah."
(Tr. 135).
"He didn't ask you then to
do it?"
"No. "
(Tr . 14 7) .
"Now, would you have made
the statement you made in
the District Court on the
grand larceny charge if
Mr. McGee had not suggested
or talked to you about the
testimony?"
"Yeah."
"You would have done it
anyway?"
"(Nods head.)"
"And you would have done
( 5)

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.

A.
A.

Q.

A.

it even though you had not
talked to Mr. McGee under
any circumstances about this?"
"Yeah."
Whose idea was it that you
should testify in Court?"
"I can't remember. Wait a
minute, whose idea was it
or what --"
"That you should testify in
Court that you took the gun."
"It was my idea, mine, that
I would say I did it."
"Okay, now when did you have
this idea, before or after
you talked to Mr. McGee?"
"I had it, well before and
after.
I was thinking, and
then I started, like I said
--well, I was.
I said to
myself, I will go ahead and
do that."
(sic)
"Now, had anyone else
suggested to you that you
should do that?"
"No."
"Did you talk to anybody
other than Mr. McGee concerning your testifying in
Court that you had taken the
gun?"
"Not that I remember."
(Tr. 151-152) .
POINT I

PERJURY IS AN ELEMENT OF SUBORNATION OF
PERJURY AND THE PERSON WHO CLAIMS HE
COMMITTED PERJURY MUST BE CORROBORATED
AS TO THE ELEMENT OF PERJURY

(6)

One of the essential elements of the
crime of "Subornation of Perjury" is to
prove that the person suborned did in
fact commit perjury.

This principle has

been set forth by the Supreme Court of
Utah as follows:
"In the crime of subornation
of perjury, two essential elements are present: (1) The
commission of perjury by the
person alleged to have been
suborned, and (2) a willful
procuring or inducing such
person to commit perjury by
the alleged suborner, he
knowing of its falsity."
State Vs. Gleason,
86 Utah
26, 40 p.2d. 222, at 225. (1935)
At the appellant's trial the Court
instructed the jury that they must find
"That perjury was committed by Eldredge
Williams,"

(Instruction No. 9, Tr. 47) .

But the Court refused to instruct the
jury that Mr. Williams' testimony as to
committing perjury must be corroborated.
To this the appellant excepted (Tr. 170-

171).

The Trial Court construed State Vs.

Gleason, supra, as follows:
(7)

"THE COURT:
I place a different interpretation on State
v. Gleason than Defense Counsel does, and I interperet it
as holding a conviction for
subornation of perjury may be
had upon the testimony of a
single witness."
(T. 171).
Appellant conceeds that under Utah
Law it is not necessary to corroborate
the allegedly suborned as to the element of subornation but we argue here
that as to the element of perjury he is
an accomplice and must be corroborated.
In State Vs. Gleason, supra, there
was an abundance of evidence as to the
question of perjury with the Court stating at page 225 "As already seen, the
fact the.perjury was committed is abundantly proved."

In fact the defendant

Gleason stipulated that the testimony of
Grace Royce was untrue.
supra, at 223.

State v. Gleason,

Appellant here argues

that the State must corroborate the testimony of Williams as to the element of per-

( 8)

jury and that the trial court must instruct the jury as to corroboration of
an accomplice.

In support of our argu-

ment we cite the following material from
State v. Gleason,supra, at 226:
"[5)
The doctrine announced
by nearly all state and federal
courts, where decisions have
been rendered, is, in cases of
subornation, that the suborned
and the suborner are accomplices
as to the perjury, and as to
that two witnesses are required,
or one witness and corroborating
circumstances, but as to other
elements of the crime such as
inducing or procuring the perjury
to be committed they are not
accomplices, and testimony as to
such matters by a person alleged
to have been suborned need not
be corroborated to sustain a conviction.
21 R.C.L. 276. See
note 56 A.L.R. 412.
Probably the leading case on
the subject is that of State v.
Renswick, 85 Minn. 19, 88 N.W.
22, wherein it was said: 'The
completed crime of subornation
of perjury consists of two essential elements, -- the commission
of perjury by the person suborned,
and the willfully procuring or
inducing him to do so by the
suborner. Gen. St. 1894, 6379.
As to the first element of the
crime, the suborned and the sub( 9)

orner are principals by virtue of the statute (Id §
6310), and necessarily each
is the accomplice of the other;
hence this element of the
crime cannot be established by
the uncorroborated evidence of
the suborned (Id. § 5767).
But as to the second element
of the crime, the suborned is
neither a principal nor an
accomplice, for legally he
cannot be quilty of persuading
himself to commit perjury.
An indictment of a party for
inducing himself to commit a
crime would be a legal absurdity.
State v. Pearce,56 Minn.
231, 57 N. W. 652, 1065;
State V. Durnam, 73 Minn. 150,
75 N. W. 1127. The conlusion
logically follows that if, in
the prosecution of a party for
subornation of perjury, it is
sought to establish the fact
that perjury was committed by
the testimony of the person
committing it, his testimony
must be corroborated as to
such fact, because as to the
perjury he is an accomplice.
But the alleged fact that he
was induced to commit the
crime by the accused may be
established by his uncorroborated testimony if it satisfied the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The rule thus announced is
approved in both State and Federal courts. Cohen v.
(10)

United States, supra; Commonwealth v. Douglass, 5 Mete.
Mass. 24; Stone v. State,
118 Ga. 705, 45 S.E.
630, 98
Am. St. Rep. 145; Bell v.
State, 5 Ga. App. 701, 63
S.E. 860; State v. Wilhelm,
114 Kan. 349, 219 p. 510;
State v. Ruskin, 117 Ohio St.
426, 159 N. E. 568, 56 A. L. R.
403; State v. Smith, 153 Minn.
167, 190 N. W. 48; Bradley v.
Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 101,
53 S.W. (2d) 215.
In at least
two jurisdictions the above
rules have been followed where
they have statutes similar to
R. S. Utah 1933, 105-21-24,
defining who are principals,
where by statute accomplices
are required to be corroborated
as provided in R. S. Utah 1933,
105-32-18. State v. Renswick,
Minn. and State v. Stone (Ga.),
supra.
In some jurisdictions
it is held the suborner and
suborned are not accomplices
at all, and in a prosecution
for subornation of perjury the
evidence of one witness, if
believed, is sufficient.
Strader v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky.
5 5 9 ' 4 2 s . w. ( 2d) 7 3 6 ;
Conn v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky.
153, 27 s.w. (2d) 736;
State v. Richardson, 248 Mo.
563, 154 S.W. 735, 44 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 307; State v. White,
Mo. Sup.
263 s.w. 192;
State v. Pratt, 21 S.D. 305,
112 N. W. 152; United States v.
Thompson (C.C.)
31 F. 331;
( 11}

Boren v. United States
144 F. 801.

(C.C.A.)

New York cases in the lower
courts hold that a suborner
and suborned are joint principals, and therefore accomplices requiring corroboration
under statutes similar to ours.
People V. Markan, 123 Misc. 689,
206 N.Y. S. 340; and see, also,
State v. Fahey,
3 Pennewill
(Del.) 594, 54 A. 690. This
however, is contrary to the
decision of this court in State
v. Justesen, 35 Utah 105; 99 Pac.
456, wherein it was held (citing headnote) that: ~Perjury
and subornation of perjury are
separate and distinct offenses,
and one charged with subornation of perjury is not an
accessory of the one committing
the perjury. '
We are inclined therefore
to follow the cases which hold
that as to the subornation
charged the evidence of one witness is sufficient to support
a verdict where the jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt
that the witness has told the
truth. The jury, of course,
are the sole judges of the weight
of the testimony and credibility
of the witnesses." (Emphasis added)
As indicated above the vast majority of
the State and Federal courts agree with
~e position argued by the appellant,

( 12)

and

that only a small minority of the jurisdictions hold that the testimony of the
alleged suborned alone is sufficient to
prove both perjury and subornation of
perjury.

Judge Gould seems to have based

his opinion of the Utah positon in State
v. Gleason, on the distinction made between the New York cases quoted above
and State v. Justesen, 35 Utah 105, 99
Pac. 456.

However, the New York cases

take the positon that the suborner and the
suborned are joint principals and require
corroboration even as to subornation.
Appellant agrees that under Utah law,
it is not necessary to corroborate the
subornation, but we feel that from the
language of State v. Gleason,

this court

intended to follow the decisions of the
vast majority of the other jurisdictions.
We further rely upon the case of
Hammer v. United states, 271 U. S. 620,

(13)

70 Led 1118 (1926) ,

Wherein the court

said, at Page 628:
"As petitioner cannot be
guilty of subornation unless
Trinz committed perjury before
the referee, the evidence
must be sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the
falsity of his oath alleged as
perjury. The question is not
whether the uncorroborated testmony of Trinz is enough to sustain a finding that his oath
before the referee was false.
Clearly the case is not as strong
for the prosecution as where a
witness, presumed to be honest
and by the government vouched
for as worthy of belief, is
called to testify to the falsity
of the oath of defendant set
forth as perjury in the indictment. Here the sole reliance of
the government is the unsupported testimony of the one for
whose character it cannot vouch-a dishonest man guilty of perjury
on one occasion or the other.
There is no reason why the testimony of such a one should be permitted to have greater weight
than that of a witness not so
discredited. People v. Evans,
40 N. Y. 1, 3."
The court further stated at
page 626:
"The general rule in prosecutions for perjury is that the
uncorroborated oath of one witness
(14)

is not enough to establish the
falsity of the testimony of
the accused set forth in the
indictment as perjury. The
applicaiton of that rule in
Federal and State courts is
well nigh universal."
In the note referred to in the above
paragraph, the court cited a multitude of
cases supporting their position.
Ed.

70 L.

1118 at 1120.

Since there was no corroboration as
to the element of perjury, the District
Court erred in not granting appellant's
Motion to Dismiss at the end of the
State's case, and further erred in not
instructing the jury that Williams'
testimony must be corroborated as to the
element of perjury.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED
AT TRIAL THAT THE APPELLANT ACTUALLY SUBORNED MR. WILLIAMS.
At appellant's trial for Subornation
of Perjury, Mr. Williams, the person who

the State alleged was suborned, did not
testify that he was suborned.
( 15)

Look-

ing at the case most favorably to the
State, the most that can be said is that
if Mr. Williams committed perjury, the
appellant may have known of Mr. Williams'
intentions prior to the trial.

We

refer the Court to the dialogue included
in the statement of facts.
The appellant was charged under
Title 76-45-9 Utah Code Annotated, 1953
which states:
"A person who willfully procures or induces another~
commit perjury in the First
Degree, is guilty of Subornation of Perjury in the
First Degree." (Emphasis added)
The testimony of Eldredge Williams
was that any perjury he may have committed was his 0wn idea.

Mr.

Williams fur-

ther stated that the appellant did not
ask him to do it nor did he threaten
him in any way.

There is no evidence

that the appellant procured or induced

Mr. Williams to commit perjury.
{16)

With respect to definitions of the
terms "INDUCE" and "PROCURE" we note
the following:
INDUCE. To bring on or about,
to affect; cause, to influence to an act or course of
conduct, lead by persuasion
or reasoning, incite by motives, prevail on. State v.
Stratford, 55 Idaho 65, 37
p. 2d 681, 68 2.
Blacks Law Dictionary, Deluxe
Fourth Edition, West Publishing
Company. Page 915
With respect to the term "Procure"
we note the definition relied upon by
the State of Nevada in State v. Watts,
296 Pac. 26,

(1931) as follows:

"'In a statute providing that
one who aids, abets, or procures another to commit a
crime may be prosecuted the
same as the principal, the
word "aid" means to help,
assist, or strengthen; the
word "abet" to encourage,
counsel, induce, or assist,
and the word"procure" means to
persuade, induce, prevail
upon or cause.'
16 C. J.
130; State v. Snell, 5 Ohio
Dec
670, 2 Ohio N. P 55."
(17)

To induce or procure requires an
affirmative act to bring about a certain result.

The only witness for the

state (Mr. Williams) who could give
any testimony about procuring or inducing, denied that Mr.

McGee induced

or procured him to commit that act.
Based on the testimony of Mr.
Williams, the court erred in refusing
to grant appellant's Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Based on the law and the facts, this
case should be remanded to the District
Court for dismissal or in the alternative for a new trial.
Respectfully Submitted

H. DON SHARP
Attorney at Law
523 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah 84401
(18)

